Majority, proportionality, governability and factions by Migheli, Matteo & Ortona, Guido
 
Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive – POLIS 








































UNIVERSITA’ DEL PIEMONTE ORIENTALE “Amedeo Avogadro”  ALESSANDRIA 
 
Periodico mensile on-line "POLIS Working Papers" - Iscrizione n.591 del 12/05/2006 - Tribunale di Alessandria 
 Majority, Proportionality, Governability and Factions 
Matteo Migheli and Guido Ortona 






Abstract. Commonsense wisdom claims that majoritarian parliaments produce more efficient 
governments than proportional ones, because there are less decisors involved. Empirical evidence 
gives poor support to this claim. A possible explanation is that the real decisors may be not the 
parties, but the factions within them. We consider some stylised   real proportional cases, i.e. 
Germany, Italy and The Netherlands, and  look through simulation for the weight that factions must 
have for governability to be lower in FPTP than in threshold proportionality. Overall, our results 
provide support for the hypothesis suggested. 
 







1. Introduction. Does majority allow for a better governability than proportionality? Obviously, 
the answer depends crucially on the meaning of governability.  Governability is a neologism; the 
Merriam-Webster on line dictionary does not list the entry. Hence we will provide our definition, 
hoping that it corresponds to scholars’ common wisdom. We assume that governability is a measure 
of the transaction costs that a government must afford when taking a decision; the lower the average 
transaction costs, the higher the governability.  
It looks quite safe to assume that the transaction costs increase with the number of decisors; 
they should be minimal in a one-person dictatorship, maximal if the unanimity rule is in force. Not 
by chance, in emergencies usual decision procedures are normally suspended in favour of a simpler 
mechanism. 
The following step should also follow immediately: majority should produce a higher 
governability with respect to proportionality. Majoritarian governments
1 are typically made of 
smaller coalitions with respect to proportional ones; actually, quite often they are one-party 
governments. Less parties imply less decisors, hence the transaction costs should be lower and the 
governability higher. This argument sounds reasonable. In the wording of Norris (2004: 67), 
'majoritarian political systems are envisaged as those concentrating power in the hands of the 
largest parliamentary party to maximise governability'; and in those of Lijphart (1994: 3) 'the 
conventional wisdom is that there is a trade-off (...) the majority governments produced by 
majoritarian election methods are more decisive, and are more effective policy makers'. According 
to a recent survey (Bowler et al., 2005), the first-past-the-post system is considered by a majority of 
scholars the best electoral system for the production of an 'effective government'.  
However, the evidence of a greater governability of majoritarian governments is not that 
sound. Empirical evidence is relatively compelling only on three points, seemingly related with 
some notion of efficiency in governing, but far from being acceptable as proxies for it. The first is a 
                                                 
1 Here and in the following, we label 'majoritarian (proportional) government' a government produced by a majoritarian  
(proportional) parliament. 
  2longer duration of majoritarian governments (see Mueller, 2003: 290 and ff.). In principle, a longer 
duration gives the government room for more ambitious policies; but it may also imply that the 
government is less contendible, and less exposed to competitive pressure. The second is that 
majoritarian governments spend less than proportional ones (see for instance Persson et al. (2007: 
3): 'we [find] that majoritarian elections lead to less public spending than proportional elections' and 
Bawn and Rosenbluth,  2006)
2. The authors that find a greater expenditure by proportional 
governments concur that it is due to the greater number of parties, a result that will prove useful for 
our discussion
3. However, a lower expenditure does not imply a greater efficiency; it may well 
correspond to a underprovision of public (or even targeted) goods. In the words of Lizzeri and 
Persico (2001: 238), 'The winner-take-all system is less efficient than a proportional system when 
the public good is very desirable, and is more efficient when the public good is not very desirable'. 
Iversen and Soskice (2006) show that proportional governments transfer more, but this may well 
correspond to a greater efficiency, because (p.179) 'transfer spending not only redistributes but also 
provides insurance [...] We have argued elsewhere that there exists a strategic complementarity 
between such insurance and individuals' decision to invest in particular types of skills'
4. Finally, 
public spending produced by majoritarian governments is more targeted towards specific groups, 
while that of proportional ones is more generalistic (see for instance Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002, 
Gagliarducci et al., 2008 and Lizzeri and Persico, 2001); it is hard to find in this feature a greater 
efficiency of majoritarian governments. 
Famously, Lijphart (1994) extended the notion of efficiency from spending to the actual 
implementation of policies in a broad array of matters, and found (p.8) that 'the overall conclusion 
                                                 
 
2 It must be noted that this result has been challenged. Funk and Gathmann (2008) do not find evidence of it in a setting 
more homogenous than a set of countries, i.e. Swiss Cantons, and Aidt et al. (2006) find that 'the change from majority 
to proportional rule, which took place in 10 of the countries [of their sample] did not contribute to growth in 
government spending'.  
 
3 It must also be noted that the effect of the electoral rule on public spending is likely to be small. According to the 
estimates by Bawn and Rosenbluth, on the average  the addition of a party (a very large addition, as the higher limit of 
the range is 4.3) increases the share of the public spending on the GNP of less than 0.5%. 
 
4 Unknown to the authors, Bird (2001) provides strong evidence in favour of this conclusion. 
 
  3must be that the conventional wisdom is wrong in positing a trade-off between the advantages of 
plurality and PR systems. The superior performance of PR with regard to political representation is 
not counterbalanced by an inferior record on governmental  effectiveness'. 
We are forced to conclude that the evidence of a greater efficiency of majoritarian 
governments is at most quite weak. At first sight, this implies that the traditional argument ('less 
decisors, more efficiency') is flawed. This is embarrassing, because of its commonsense validity. If 
(a) there are less decisors, (b) the transaction costs decline with the number of decisors, and (c) the 
decisors aim to maximise the consensus, a majoritarian government should produce a better 
governance, as fewer resources will be depleted in transaction costs. Where may the flaw be? When 
we put the question in these terms, an answer comes easily to mind. There is no guarantee that less 
parties amount to less decisors, i.e. that transaction costs within the government's party (or parties) 
are significantly lower than those among parties. 
  To test this hypothesis is the subject of this paper. More precisely, we will check through 
simulation on realistic cases whether the governability of a majoritarian system may actually be 
lower than that of a proportional one, if one takes into account the role of the factions within the 
parties. The methodology that we will employ is described in next section. Section 3 provides the 
empirical results, and section 4 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Methodology. We will compare the parliaments and the governments resulting  from the same 
set of preferences of the voters under first-past-the-post and under threshold proportionality (from 
now on FPTP and TP). The first is the typical majoritarian system. The second is representative of 
the family of proportional systems; actually, most democracies adopt some sort of proportionality, 
but pure proportionality is rare, and the norm is corrected proportionality
5. Both systems will be 
assessed against the benchmark of a proxy of an ideal full proportional system, as will be explained 
below. To compare the parliaments produced by different electoral systems given the same set of 
                                                 
5 The correction to pure proportionality induced by a threshold may be easily, albeit roughly, translated into a correction 
induced by the district magnitude. See sect.3. 
 
  4preferences we resorted to simulation, employing the simulation program ALEX, developed at the 
Università del Piemonte Orientale
6. 
We define ideal proportional system  a one-district, perfectly proportional systems where 
elections do not entail participation costs of any kind. Our basic assumption is that factions in the 
majoritarian system (as well as in all systems different from the ideal proportionality) will appear as 
parties in the ideal proportional system. In other terms, the clusters of opinions and/or interests 
sufficiently large and coherent to produce a party running at no cost in a full-proportional, one-
district system will maintain some degree of independence in a different system. This implies that in 
a real system the number of decisors may be greater than that of parties in the majority. The degree 
of independence ranks between nil, in which case factions are irrelevant (and the number of 
decisors is that of parties), to full, in which case the real number of decisors is the number of would-
be parties in the ideal proportional system. The independence may be maintained in a number of 
ways (secretive agreements among lobbies,  weight to be assigned to the wants of given groups of 
voters, after-vote compromises on the policies, and so on); but this is not relevant for our 
discussion.  
In this environment, it is possible for FPTP to produce less governability than TP. Suppose 
that under FPTP the majority is made of one party, but that this party is made in turn of four fully 
autonomous factions. Now suppose that under TP the majority enjoys the same number of seats, but 
it is made of three parties. If each party corresponds to a faction, the governability is arguably larger 
than under FPTP. We will return to this example below.   
As stated above, we adopt an experimental approach. This requires that our results must refer 
to realistic cases to have some value. It is obvious that to try to infer from a real FPTP case the 
number and sizes of would-be parties in a proportional system, given the same set of preferences of 
the voters, is highly hazardous. On the contrary, the opposite is much more plausible. Unavoidably, 
we were forced to approximate our ideal proportional system with the real one
7. This forces us to 
                                                 
6 For a description of the simulation program see Bissey and Ortona (2007) and Bissey et al. (2004). 
 
  5use as case studies only countries that actually adopt a highly proportional system. Consequently, 
we chose a sample of countries that have large or nation-wide districts, i.e. Germany, Italy and The 
Netherlands; actually a sketch of them, due to the limits of the simulation program, but as we will 
see these limits are fairly broad. Hence, the input is made basically of the votes that each party 
received in the last election (The Netherlands) or in the second to last election (Germany and Italy) 
of the lower chamber
8. Country specific and general details are in the appendix, together with basic 
data. In the following, the three simulation experiments will be labelled Virtual Germany, Virtual 
Italy, and the The Virtual Netherlands.  
The simulation program produces a parliament for each electoral system considered, given the 
same set of preferences of the voters, and for each parliament computes several indices of 
governability (and also of proportionality, but they have no relevance for our discussion). We will 





where Si is the share of seats of the governing coalition in system i, Ni is the number of parties of 
the governing coalition in system i (which may well be 1), P is the number of parties that in the pure 
proportional, one-district system  would produce a government majority that includes the same 
parties of the government majority of system i, plus as few parties as possible, and a is parameter 
ranging from 0 to 1. Note that 0<G3≤1. ALEX produces also the value of Si/Ni, labelled G2. This 
will be useful below.  
To determine which parties enter the government, for FPTP  we assume that it is made by a 
minimal winning coalition (MWC). As for pure proportionality, if the coalition winning in FPTP 
does not reach the majority, the majority will incorporate further parties on its left (right) if it is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
7 In the last section we will suggest an approach that in principle could  avoid this limitation. 
 
8 For Germany, we considered the second to last election because the first version of this article was written mostly 
before the last one; and for  Italy, for the reason explained in the appendix. 
 
  6leftist (rightist) until the majority is obtained, following the collocation of the parties on the left-
right axis. Again, we suppose MWCs; only for The Netherlands we considered also a different 
scenario, as will be explained below.  
The first term of the index, (Si/Ni), is the simplest expression of the assumption that 
governability is enhanced by the share of seats of the majority coalition, and reduced by the number 
of parties belonging to it. The second term, (Ni/Pi)
a, adds the weight of the factions. As stated 
above, the factions are assumed to be made of the parties in the ideal proportional system  that 
would 'shrink' into less parties in a different system. If, at one extreme, the value of a is 0, G3 
reduces to Si/Ni, i.e. to G2, thus implying that factions are irrelevant. At the other extreme, if a = 1, 
G3 collapses to Si/Pi, thus implying that the real parties are those present in ideal proportionality, i.e. 
that factions maintain their full autonomy as decisors. Clearly, the role of the factions increases as a 
moves from 0 to 1.  
In this paper we will compare the values of G3 for FPTP and for TP for the three cases listed 
above. We will consider only reasonable values of the threshold, arbitrarily but realistically 
assumed to range, in integers, from 3% to 10%. We will look for couples of values of a and of the 
threshold such that G3 is lower in FPTP than in TP, and we will discuss their plausibility.  
What above requires the assignment of a real-life meaning to parameter a. This meaning may 
be assessed as follows. The governability index G2, i.e. (Si/Ni), assumes that the party (or the 
parties) of the majority is (are) the real decisor(s). Now consider the ratio (G2-G3)/G2 for system i. 
The value of this ratio, that we label R, is 1-(Ni/Pi)
a. Clearly, each value of a may be translated into 
a value of R, i.e. into a value of the relative decrease that G3 produces in the assessment of the 
governability with respect to the case where factions are irrelevant.  
 
3. Results. Before moving to the results of the simulations, let's produce, for sake of clarity, an 
exemplum fictum. Suppose a 100-seat chamber. Suppose also that under the ideal  purely-
proportional system, i.e. in absence of running costs, the assignments of seats to the first five 
  7parties, ordered left to right, is 5, 5, 20, 25 and 15. Finally, suppose that moving to FPTP the first 
four will keep the same number of seats, but will join into just one party. They will form an one-
party government supported by 55 seats, and it is easy to compute out the values of G2, G3 with a=0 
and G3 with a=1. They are 0.55, 0.55 and 0.1375 respectively. Now suppose to move to TP instead, 
and that the seat assignment becomes 0, 0, 20, 25 and 10. The government will be made by the three 
not-nil parties; the values of G2, G3 with a=0 and G3 with a =1 will all become 0.183 - a figure 
greater than 0.1375. This implies that there is a threshold value of a that makes G3 higher in TP than 
in FPTP. 
Now let's move to the real results. Table 1 shows the results for the Virtual Germany case. In 
column 1 there are the thresholds for the proportional system. In column 2 there is the average 
district magnitude equivalent to that threshold, computed on the basis of the empirical formula 
suggested by Lijphart (1999), according to which K = 75/T - 1, where T is the (percent) threshold 
and K is the average district magnitude. In column 3 there is the value of the parameter a that makes 
identical the values of G3 for FPTP and threshold proportionality. Column 4 shows the 
corresponding value of the reduction factor R for FPTP, as defined above. 
 
Table 1  Results of the simulation for Virtual Germany
9
Threshold average  district 
magnitude 
equivalent to the 
threshold  
value of a such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (a*) 
value of R such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (R*) 
3% 24.00  0.518  0.302 
4% 17.75  0.518  0.302 
5% 14.00  0.518  0.302 
6% 11.50  0.518  0.302 
7% 9.71  0.518  0.302 
8% 8.37  0.406  0.245 
9%  7.33  Not existent  Not existent 
10%  6.50  Not existent  Not existent 
 
Not existent: G3 is always greater in TP. 
 
                                                 
9 Here are the details of the computing (m denotes FPTP and p threshold proportionality). From  (Sp/Np)(Np/Pp)
a* = 
(Sm/Nm)(Nm/Pm)
a* we get a* = [ln(Sm/Nm)-ln(Sp/Np)]/[ln(Np/Pp)-ln(Nm/Pm)]. R* follows immediately. 
 
  8We read row 1 as follows: if the role of factions is such that in FPTP it reduces the 
governability of more than 30.2% with respect to the case where factions are irrelevant, the 
governability of FPTP is lower than that of that of TP with a threshold of 3%. Also, if the role of 
factions is such that in FPTP it reduces the governability of more than 30.2% with respect to the 
case where factions are irrelevant, the governability of FPTP is likely to be lower than that  of pure 
proportionality with an average district magnitude of 24
10.  As we see from the following rows, the 
value of the requested reduction factor declines with the increase of the threshold and with the 
decrease of the district magnitude, as expected.  
Table 2 shows the analogous results for Virtual Italy. Again, there are values of a* and R* 
such that TP produces a higher governability than FPTP, and again these values decline as the 
electoral threshold increases. However, the weight of the factions must be considerably greater; for 
a reasonable 5% threshold, it must reduce the governability in FTPT of 78% with respect to the case 
where parties are fully empowered as decisors.  
 
Table 2  Results of the simulation for Virtual Italy. 
Threshold average  district 
magnitude 
equivalent to the 
threshold  
value of a such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (a*) 
value of R such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (R*) 
3% 24.00  0.721  0.795 
4% 17.75  0.721  0.795 
5% 14.00  0.658  0.780 
6% 11.50  0.658  0.780 
7% 9.71  0.617  0.758 
8% 8.37  0.558  0.723 
9% 7.33  0.558  0.723 
10% 6.50  0.558  0.723 
 
The Virtual Netherlands (tables 3a and 3b) required an adjustment.  The inclusion of further 
parties does not produce a minimal winning coalition in the proportional system; in order to obtain 
it, the second-to-last party on the right must be excluded in favour of the last one. Consequently, 
                                                 
10 What above holds if (d/da)(G3,t/G3,f)> 0, where t denotes TP and f FPTP. In normal cases this is true. The proof 
follows. (G3,t/G3,f)=[(St/Nt)/(Sf/Nf)][(Nt/Pt)/(Nf/Pf)]
a. Call X the constant [(St/Nt)/(Sf/Nf)] and Y the basis [(Nt/Pt)/(Nf/Pf)]. 
Hence (d/da)(G3,t/G3,f) = K(LnY)Y
a. We rule out the case of (Nt/Pt)<(Nf/Pf) [i.e. LnY<0] as very peculiar, and that of 
(Nt/Pt)=(Nf/Pf) [i.e. LnY=0] because in this case there is no systematic reason why the governability should be greater in 
FPTP in absence of factions, and consequently we are out of the subject of this paper. Hence (Nt/Pt)>(Nf/Pf) and all the 
figures in the derivative are positive. 'Likely to be' is due to the empirical nature of Lijphart's formula.  
  9two scenarios are possible: both are plausible, so we considered both. Under the first, we suppose 
that the would-be parties of pure proportionality that join to form the parties in FPTP are the ones 
that create a MWC. Under the second, we suppose that no party is bypassed, and an additional party 
is  included.  As may be seen in table 3, the results for the two scenarios are similar, and in line with 
those of Germany and Italy. 
 
Table 3a  Results of the simulation for The Virtual Netherlands, MWC scenario. 
Threshold average  district 
magnitude 
equivalent to the 
threshold  
value of a such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (a*) 
value of R such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (R*) 
3%  24.00  Not existent  Not existent 
4%  17.75  Not existent  Not existent 
5% 14.00  0.9705  0.244 
6% 11.50  0.9705  0.244 
7% 9.71  0.9705  0.244 
8% 8.37  0.9705  0.244 
9% 7.33  0.9705  0.244 
10% 6.50  0.9705  0.244 
 






Table 3b  Results of the simulation for The Virtual Netherlands, non-MWC scenario. 
Threshold average  district 
magnitude 
equivalent to the 
threshold  
value of a such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (a*) 
value of R such that G3 is 
equal for FPTP 
and TP (R*) 
3%  24.00  Not existent  Not existent 
4%  17.75  Not existent  Not existent 
5% 14.00  0.9705  0.3909 
6% 11.50  0.9705  0.3909 
7% 9.71  0.9705  0.3909 
8% 8.37  0.9705  0.3909 
9% 7.33  0.9705  0.3909 
10% 6.50  0.9705  0.3909 
 
Not existent: G3 is always greater in FPTP. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and suggestions for further research. Our experimental evidence supports the 
hypothesis that factions may explain the 'missing governability' of majoritarian Parliaments. First, 
  10and most important, in all the examples there is the possibility that TP performs better than FPTP: 
there are values of a that allow for this result. Second, in two cases, Virtual Germany and The 
Virtual Netherlands, the reduction that factions must impose to the governability of FPTP in order 
to make it lower than that of threshold proportionality is reasonably small, around 30% in the first 
case and 25% in the second. As for Virtual Italy, higher values of R* are requested, around 70-80%; 
but it may be stressed that in the reality the role of factions is very high in Italy, hence it is not 
unrealistic to suppose that they do actually reduce the governability to the (estimated) level 
required. Finally, it must be stressed that the approximation of the ideal proportional system with 
the real one arguably reduces the  role of the factions as perceived in our index, hence the values of 
R that appear in the tables should be considered as maximum estimates.  
        This said, a lot of caveats are de rigueur. First, the governability indices employed are quite 
rough; in particular, to assume that G2 grows linearly with Si is probably too strong. More subtly, to 
assume that the parameter a is constant is also arbitrary. In fact, a may be read as the elasticity of 
governability with respect to the number of would-be parties in the ideal proportional system; it 
may well be a country-specific figure. Second, the incidence of the factions could be weighed with 
an index of their power inside the coalition. Third, we assumed MWCs to avoid arbitrariness, but 
this assumption is not fully realistic, mostly with reference to TP. Finally, and obviously, the 
approximation of the ideal proportionality with the real one is clearly reductive, as noted above.  
Hence, our paper must be considered quite preliminary, and our main (and only) conclusion is 
that  simulative evidence does not deny that factions may reduce the governability more 
significantly in majoritarian systems than in proportional ones. There is a consolidated literature on 
the loss of efficiency due to the activity of factions
11. What our paper adds to that literature is that 
the factions may  explain the "missing efficiency" of majoritarian systems with respect to 
proportionality.  
                                                 
 
11 See for instance Persico et al. (2007), and the literature quoted therein. 
 
  11It should be of interest to look for further evidence, possibly with a sounder methodology, not 
necessarily fully quantitative. The effect of factions on governability could be assessed for instance 
through the study of the proceedings of parties' meetings, or through interviews with experts. 
However, data collected qualitatively could  provide the inputs for the evaluation of a more suitable 
index, hence the improvement of the indices is also relevant.  
If one wants to stick to our methodology, an interesting development should be to infer the 
number and the weight of parties under ideal proportionality through an inductive analysis on 
survey data. In principle, every cluster of opinions and/or interests should correspond to an ideal 
party. This approach is quite demanding; the results of this paper suggest that probably it is worthy 
to try.   
 
 
  12Appendix. Input data 
 
The data used in the simulations are the real data of the last election in the Netherlands (2006) 
and of the second to last in Germany (2008) and in Italy (2006). The rationale for this choice for 
Italy is that in the last election (2008) the largest incumbent party, the Partito Democratico, was not 
part of any coalition. This could have entailed strategic voting (and probably did), because the 
cumbersome electoral law assigns a majority prize to the winning coalition (or party).  
We considered only the lower chamber, and all the parties which obtained at least one seat in 
it. The total number of seats in the simulations is the actual number of seats, hence it is different in 
the three virtual cases. Each uninominal district was supposed to have 100 voters. For threshold 
proportionality we supposed a unique nation-wide district, to simplify the simulation (which for the 
cases of Germany and Italy included the definition of more than 60,000 virtual voters). To keep into 
account the district magnitude we opted for the simpler procedure of resorting to the Lijphart 
formula (see the text). Obviously, further inquiry could add realism through the introduction of 
districts of different magnitudes
12. Also, we did not consider strategic voting, due to the 
unavoidable arbitrariness that it would have entailed
13. Note however that strategic voting would 
probably reduce the number of parties in the Parliament under FPTP, thus reinforcing the results of 
the paper. 
 In all the three cases at least one party did not get any seat in the simulation; the votes of 
these parties have been reallocated proportionally, in order to avoid the presence of a residual party, 
which could have biased the analysis.  
The simulation program allows to take into account the possible geographical concentration of 
the votes of the parties. This is an important feature, because it avoids the generalization in FPTP of 
a small overall majority to all the seats, and makes the simulation more realistic
14. In the simulation 
                                                 
12 The simulation program includes this feature. 
 
13 This feature too can be managed through the simulation program. 
 
  13program the concentration appears as a correction factor (the concentration index) that assigns a 
higher share of votes in a subset of districts with respect to the national average (this obviously 
entails a lower share elsewhere). The correction factor is specific for each party, but for each party 
it must be unique nationwide. Hence the concentration of the parties has been calculated as follows.  
Germany:  for parties concentrated in several länder, we considered the seats attributed to each 
land and the concentration of the party in that specific land. Then we calculated the global 
concentration index, taking the weighted average of the concentration index for each land, using the 
number of seats of the land as weights.  
Italy: for parties concentrated in several regioni, we considered the seats attributed to each 
regione (where necessary we added up the districts belonging to that regione) and the concentration 
of the party in that specific regione. Then we calculated the global concentration index, taking the 
weighted average of the concentration index for each regione, using the number of seats of the 
regione as weights. 
The Netherlands: we considered first the number of electors in each province over the total 
number of electors at national level. Then we 'attributed' to each province a number of seats 
proportional to the share of voters of the province
15. Finally, we proceeded as before, taking the 
notional number of seats for each province as weights.  
Given our interest in the first-pass-the-post system, we considered the concentration only of 
the parties which got the relative majority of votes in each land, regione or Province. This allowed 
us to retain some regional parties, which would have otherwise disappeared. 
The tables below contain the data employed in the simulation.   




                                                                                                                                                                  
14 Note however that in the program the vote for FPTP is stochastic; if for instance a party has an overall share of votes 
of 60%,  this means that each virtual voter has a 60% probability of voting for that party in each uninominal district. As 
a result there will probably be districts where other parties will get the seat. For details see Bissey and Ortona (2007) 
and Bissey et al. (2004). 
 
15 Remember that in The (real) Netherlands there is a unique nationwide district. 
  14Germany 
 




PDS 8.7  0 
Grune 8.1  0 
SPD 34.2  296 
CDU 27.8  196 
CSU 7.4  89 
FDP 9.8  0 









PRC 5.8  0 
PCI 2.3  0 
Verdi 2.1  0 
Ulivo 31.3  207 
SVP 0.5  11 
UV 0.1 1 
Rosa n. Pugno  2.6  0 
IDV 2.3  0 
UDEUR 1.4  0 
UDC 6.8  0 
DC-PSI 0.7  0 
Lega Nord  4.6  0 
F. Italia  23.7  152 









PvdD 1.8  0 
D66 2.0  0 
Groen Links  4.6  0 
SP 16.6  0 
PvdA 21.2  34 
CU 4.0 0 
CDA 26.5  49 
VVD 14.7  0 
SGP 1.6  0 




  15The following tables show the composition of the governments assumed in the simulations. 
For each party it is stated whether it is part of the governing coalition or not. The last column 
indicates the total number of seats of the governing coalition. The last rows define the governments 









  PDS Grune SPD CDU CSU FDP NDP Seats
FPTP no no  no yes yes  no no 317 
TP  3% yes yes  yes no  no  no  no  332 
TP  4% yes yes  yes no  no  no  no  332 
TP  5% yes yes  yes no  no  no  no  332 
TP  6% yes yes  yes no  no  no  no  332 
TP  7% yes yes  yes no  no  no  no  332 
TP  8% yes yes  yes no  no  no  no  359 
TP  9%  no no  no yes no yes  no 324 
TP  10%  no no  yes  no  no no no 345 
PP
1 yes yes  yes no  no  no  no  318 
PP
2 no  no  yes yes  yes yes no  494 
 





  PRC PCI Verdi Ul. SVP UV RNP 
 
IDV UD.R UDC DC-
PSI 
LN FI  AN Seats
FPTP  no  no no  yes  no  no no  no  no  no  no  no no no 367 
 TP 3%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  354 
TP 4%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  354 
TP 5%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  yes  yes  339 
TP 6%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  yes  yes  339 
TP 7%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  yes  yes  365 
TP 8%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  339 
TP 9%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  339 
TP 10%  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  339 
PP
1 yes yes  yes  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  no no  no  no 358 
PP
2 no no  no  no  no no  no no no  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  316 
 
1: left-wing government used as reference for FPTP government; 2: right-wing government  
                                                 
16
16 In the case of TP at 9% level, the CSU is excluded from the government because it gets no seats in the simulation. 
The same holds for DC-PSI in the next table at all the threshold levels.   






  PvdD D66 Gr.L. SP PvdA CU CDA VVD SGP VVD Seats 
FPTP no no  no no  no no  yes  yes  no  no 83 
TP  3%  no no  no no  no no  yes  yes  no  no 76 
TP  4%  no no  no no  no no  yes  yes  no  no 76 
TP  5% no  no  no  no  no  no yes  yes  yes no  84 
TP  6% no  no  no  no  no  no yes  yes  yes no  84 
TP  7% no  no  no  no  no  no yes  yes  yes no  84 
TP  8% no  no  no  no  no  no yes  yes  yes no  84 
TP  9% no  no  no  no  no  no yes  yes  yes no  84 
TP  10%  no no  no no  no no  yes  yes  yes  no 84 
PP  no  no no  no  no  yes yes yes yes  yes 85 
PP
1 no  no no  no  no  yes yes yes no yes 79 
 
1: The same as the previous, but excluding the SGP so to identify the MWC 
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